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Abstract 
The “World Politics of Social Investment” (WoPSI) project aims at 
explaining variance in social investment agendas and social in-
vestment reforms across democratic countries in different regions of 
the World. Virtually all capitalist economies grapple with challenges 
of demographic change, slow economic growth, poor employment 
performance and increasing poverty rates. In dealing with these pro-
blems, a social investment strategy appeals to a wide audience, both 
political and academic. However, social investment reforms and per-
formances in democratic countries around the globe are highly une-
qual and remain fragmentary: different countries have implemented 
different types of policy instruments, with different functions, at diffe-
rent points in time, and to different degrees.  
Despite a growing number of scientific contributions on social in-
vestment reforms and their effects, a systematic mapping of the de-
sign of social investment agendas and policies in different democra-
tic countries around the globe is still lacking. Moreover, we lack an 
explanation for the variance in the development of social investment 
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policy reforms. This is where we locate the research interest of the 
project presented in this paper. In order to understand why social 
investment agendas and policies have developed differently across 
countries, we need to study the politics of social investment reforms. 
Thus, we ask: How do social investment agendas and social in-
vestment policy reforms vary across democratic countries around the 
globe? Under what political conditions do social investment agendas 
and/or reforms develop?  
In this paper, we situate these questions in the existing state of the 
literature, and we outline a way to answer these research questions 
in the context of social policy reforms in Latin America, East Asia, as 
well as Western and Eastern Europe. We argue that political coali-
tions (actors and their interests), as well as the institutional embed-
dedness of social investment politics are key factors in explaining the 
high variety of social investment agendas and policies between coun-
tries.  
Keywords: Welfare states, social policy, social investment
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1. Introduction: Social Investment Politics around the Globe – 
research questions and goals of the project 
The “World Politics of Social Investment” (WoPSI) project aims at 
explaining variance in social investment agendas and social in-
vestment reforms across democratic countries in different regions of 
the World.  
Social investment has become more than a buzzword in political and 
academic discussions (Esping-Andersen 2002, Hemerijck 2012, Morel 
et al. 2012). Virtually all capitalist economies grapple with challenges 
of demographic change, slow economic growth, poor employment 
performance and increasing poverty rates as a consequence of structu-
ral change, dualized labour markets, as well as new social needs and 
demands that grow out of post-industrial patterns of family and labour 
market reconfiguration. In dealing with these problems, the language 
and core ideas of social investment appeal to a wide audience, both 
political and academic. However, despite the immediate appeal of this 
policy strategy, social investment reforms and performances in demo-
cratic countries around the globe are highly unequal and fragmentary 
(Beramendi et al. 2015, Bonoli 2013, Hemerijck 2012, Morgan 2012, 
Nikolai 2012).  
The literature shows that over the past three decades, there has been a 
substantial amount of implementation of social investment policies in 
different regions of the world (Latin America, Asia, East- and Western 
Europe). However, the turn to social investment is highly diverse in its 
form and extent: Different countries have implemented different types 
of policy instruments, with different functions, at different points in 
time, and to different degrees (Bonoli 2013, Hemerijck 2013, Jenson 
2012, Morel et al. 2012).  
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Despite a growing number of scientific contributions on social in-
vestment reforms and their effects, a systematic mapping of the design 
of social investment agendas and policies in different democratic 
countries around the globe is still lacking. Moreover, we lack an ex-
planation for the variance in the development of social investment 
policy reforms. This is where we locate the research interest of this 
project. We argue that in order to understand why social investment 
agendas and policies have developed to different extents, in different 
forms, and at different points in time across countries, we need to stu-
dy the politics of social investment reforms. Thus, we have the follo-
wing main research questions: 
 How do social investment agendas and social investment poli-
cy reforms vary across democratic countries around the globe? 
How can we explain this diversity? 
 Under what political conditions do social investment agendas 
and/or reforms develop? 
 
We want to answer these research questions in the context of social 
policy reforms in Latin America, East Asia, as well as Western and 
Eastern Europe, and we are interested in social investment agendas 
and policy reforms in all social policy fields. We argue that political 
coalitions (actors and their interests), as well as the institutional em-
beddedness of social investment politics are key factors in explaining 
the high variety of social investment agendas and policies between 
countries (see section 4 of this background paper).  
This working paper is a programmatic background paper to the pro-
ject. It is aimed at situating our project in the existing literature, defi-
ning the key research questions and developing a theoretical frame-
work that is formulated in a sufficiently general way so that it applies 
to the politics of social investment reform in all democracies around 
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the world. The background paper also defines the key concepts of the 
chosen approach (e.g. “social investment”, “agendas”, “social in-
vestment policies”, “policy legacies”, and “social investment re-
forms”). It is structured as follows. In the following section 2, we dis-
cuss where the literature on social investment stands, i.e. we present 
empirical findings on social investment agendas and reforms in coun-
tries around the globe, as well as on the distributive effects of social 
investment policies. Section 3 consists in a broad literature review of 
theoretical arguments explaining variance in social investment poli-
cies, and welfare states more generally. In section 4, we provide our 
key definitions, research questions, and our main theoretical focus, as 
well as the contours of the planned research design.  
2. What we know best so far: The emergence and effects of social 
investment policies  
Existing research on social investment can be divided in two main 
strands of literature. A first strand explores the design and emergence 
of social investment policies in specific policy fields and/or specific 
countries and regions of the world (section 2.1). A second strand of 
literature analyses the effects of social investment policies on socio-
economic and political outcomes, such as social inclusion and poverty 
reduction (section 2.2). Many of the existing studies have focused on 
Western democracies, often even only on Western Europe, despite the 
fact that democracies around the globe have conducted similar re-
forms. With this project, we aim at gathering research from all parts of 
the world. Moreover, hardly any studies attempt to systematize and to 
explain the variety of social investment agendas and policies across 
countries, which will be a major focus of our project.  
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2.1 The emergence of social investment policies in different 
countries and world regions 
In this section, we provide a first overview of the programmes and 
reforms adopted in the countries we are interested in. We naturally 
cannot provide an exhaustive account, but will rather illustrate social 
investment reform processes with empirical examples. As our account 
is necessarily incomplete, we hope for contributors to our project to 
fill these gaps, either by focusing on the politics of the mentioned re-
forms, or to focus on other debates/policies/programmes/reforms that 
we have missed here. The main purpose of this section is to underline 
the diversity in the development of social investment reforms around 
the world. 
Later in this background paper, we will provide our own definition of 
social investment, adjusted to the purposes of our project. In order to 
identify the existing literature on social investment, we used as a pre-
liminary definition the one proposed by Morel et al. (2012): “The so-
cial investment approach rests on policies that both invest in human 
capital development (early childhood education and care, education 
and life-long training) and that help to make efficient use of human 
capital (through policies supporting women’s and lone parents’ em-
ployment, through active labour market policies, but also through 
specific forms of labour market regulation and social protection insti-
tutions that promote flexible security), while fostering greater social 
inclusion (notably by facilitating access to the labour market for 
groups that have traditionally been excluded). Crucial to this new ap-
proach is the idea that social policies should be seen as a productive 
factor, essential to economic development and to employment 
growth.” (Morel et al. 2012: 2).  
Because we know this literature better, we start by discussing some 
findings for the Western European countries. Here we focus on active 
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labour market policies (ALMPs) as well as family and education poli-
cies, even though we are aware that other policies in various policy 
fields can be associated with a social investment logic. We however 
hope that as a result of our project, the knowledge about existing so-
cial investment agendas and reforms will be much more shared and 
balanced amongst the various policy fields and regions of the world.  
Western European welfare states have implemented social investment 
reforms to very different degrees (Beramendi et al. 2015, Bonoli 2013, 
Hemerijck 2012, 2013, Morgan 2012, Nikolai 2012). In Europe, the 
Nordic European countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland) 
are usually mentioned as the most advanced in terms of social in-
vestments. These countries have known ample and largely successful 
programs of this sort for several decades (e.g. Gingrich and Ansell 
2015, Nelson and Stephens 2012), even though recently there seems to 
be a certain level of de-investment in those policies (Kraft and Van 
Kersbergen fthc.). For Sweden, where spending on ALMPs was ex-
ceptionally high already during the 1980s, Bonoli (2013: 30) observes 
a de-investment on ALMPs during the last twenty years. All Scandi-
navian countries invested heavily in all forms of education already 
during the 1950s, expanded post-secondary education and universal, 
high qualitative childcare much earlier than most other countries (Bu-
semeyer 2015, Garritzmann 2016, Iversen and Stephens 2008). In ad-
dition, compared to other West European welfare states, the Nordic 
countries spend most on ALMPs (Bonoli 2013: 28-46). However, only 
Sweden was a traditional high spender on ALMPs in the 1980s alrea-
dy. The other Nordic countries – starting with equally low amounts of 
spending as continental European countries in the 1980s – became top 
spender on ALMPs only during the 1990s (Bonoli 2013: 34f.).  
Continental European countries (Bismarckian welfare states) (such as 
Germany, Austria, and France), in contrast, have historically been 
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strongly consumption-oriented, focusing especially on male bread-
winner insurance (Esping-Andersen 1990). Recently, however, several 
studies document an expansion of social investment policies, especial-
ly in the fields of family policy and – to some extent – activation poli-
cy. Germany and Switzerland can be mentioned as examples of conti-
nental welfare states, where social investment reforms took the form 
of care infrastructure, fiscal incentives for childcare, as well as activa-
tion programmes with regard to the unemployed or disabled (Bleses 
and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004, Fleckenstein 2011, Gerlach, 2004, Häuser-
mann and Kübler 2011, Häusermann and Zollinger 2014, Hieda 2013, 
Morgan 2013, Naumann 2005, 2012). Other continental welfare states 
also intensified social investment to different degrees and in different 
forms. Generally, continental European countries have intensified 
their spending on ALMPs over the past twenty years, albeit to a lesser 
extent than Northern Europe (Bonoli 2013: 43). Continental European 
countries have embarked on the social investment turn considerably 
later than the Nordic countries. They still display a lower level of 
spending on childcare or ALMPs (Bonoli 2013: 31), as well as a high 
internal variation. The same holds true for education spending: Des-
pite the fact that education has featured increasingly saliently on the 
political and the public agenda (Ansell 2010, Busemeyer et al. 2013), 
in most continental European countries, education systems remain 
underfunded, especially higher and early childhood education (Buse-
meyer 2015, Garritzmann 2016, Iversen and Stephens 2008). 
Liberal welfare states (e.g., the UK, Canada, the USA) are generally 
less generous when it comes to social compensation policies (Esping-
Andersen 1990). Regarding some types of social investment, however, 
liberal welfare states have early on focused on education and skill 
development. In fact, Heidenheimer (1973) and others (Beramendi et 
al. 2015, Busemeyer and Nikolai 2010, Iversen 2005) argue that while 
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conservative welfare states have focused on compensation and did not 
develop investment policies, liberal welfare states have focused on 
investment at the expense of compensatory policies. Thus, despite the 
fact that social compensation spending is at best average in liberal 
welfare states, education spending (both private and public) is compa-
ratively high. Recently, this agenda has been broadened in some libe-
ral welfare states. In the UK, for example, parents of young children 
gained the right to ask for a flexible work schedule, paid leave-
schemes were introduced, and childcare expanded (Morgan 2013). In 
May 2004 the Brittish government announced a plan to offer middle-
income families tax reliefs for hiring nannies (Morgan 2013: 94). 
However, the English speaking countries are low spenders on ALMPs 
in Europe, even though spending has increased during the last twenty 
years (Bonoli 2013: 31). English-speaking countries introduced the 
cheapest active labour market policies; in liberal welfare states 
ALMPs are based on work incentives rather than on investing in hu-
man capital (Bonoli 2013: 33, 43). Such reforms that strengthen the 
work incentives for job seekers, as benefit conditionality, do not 
necessarily impact spending, but put pressure on beneficiaries to rein-
tegrate into labour market.  
Southern European countries (such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal) have 
recently introduced several social investment reforms in different po-
licy fields. Yet, spending in these fields increased only in the late 
2000s, and remains on a comparatively lower level than in the other 
European welfare regimes (Bonoli 2013: 31). However, proportionally 
these countries have faced the biggest increase in spending in ALMPs 
during the last twenty years. They have also shown some structural 
change in their family policies. Southern European countries have 
long been characterized as welfare systems of ‘unsupported’ familia-
lism (Léon and Pavolini 2014: 354). However, since the early 1990s a 
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social investment turn in family policy can be observed in some coun-
tries, mainly in Spain. Most importantly, Spain introduced universal 
pre-school education in 1990 (ibid.: 358), while childcare provision 
for children started to grow substantially during the years before the 
outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007. In addition, there have been 
several improvements of maternity and paternity leave and the crea-
tion of a national law for long-term care (ibid.: 359). In Italy since the 
late 1990s there have been some social policy reforms, which pro-
moted care services, but only limited resources were provided for its 
implementation (ibid.: 355, Morgan 2013: 100). Even though there 
have been many new family and care policies in Spain and some of 
them in Italy, during the recent financial crisis budgetary cuts have 
affected these policies considerably.  
Whereas spending on ALMPs remains comparatively low among all 
Eastern European countries, social investment policies on family poli-
cies have gained relevance since the 2000s, however to very different 
degrees in several countries. Eastern European countries (Czech Re-
public, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) spend even less on ALMPs 
than Southern European countries (Hemerijck 2013: 232, 259). 
However, in Czech Republic and Poland spending on ALMPs nearly 
doubled in the last ten years (1995-2005) whereas it stagnated or even 
decreased in Hungary and Slovakia respectively. In the formerly so-
cialist Eastern European countries, women were encouraged to join 
the labour force by special incentives including publicly provided, 
affordable childcare services already before the 1990s (Szelewa and 
Polakowski 2008). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the go-
vernments in the states of Eastern Europe closed many childcare 
centres and withdrew financial support (ibid.: 115). The beginning of 
the 1990s has been described as post-communist era of “re-
familialization” (Szelewa and Polakowski 2008, Saxonberg and 
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Szelewa 2007). However, Szelewa and Polakowski (2008: 126) show 
convincingly that instead of an overall tendency towards familializa-
tion of policies in East European countries, over the last two decades 
(1990-2005) post-communist countries follow different types of fami-
lialization: Some of them have strengthened defamilializing policies 
and introduced social investment components in their family policies. 
After a decline of enrolment rates of children in childcare centres in 
the first half of the 1990s, several countries noted a considerable im-
provement since the late 1990s (ibid.: 122f.). The enrolment rates are 
for example comparatively higher in the Czech Republic, Estonia, and 
Hungary and rather low in Poland and Slovenia. The generosity of 
parental leave provision increased in all Eastern European countries 
over time, but with great variance between the countries. Hungary, 
which already had the most generous family support system in the 
world four decades ago, still has an earnings-related payment that lasts 
for two years (ibid.: 124). The Czech Republic introduced a universal 
parental leave scheme in the middle of the 1990s, which was extended 
to four years. Regarding higher education, some Eastern European 
countries have moved in the direction of “dualized systems”, where 
the best students study free of charge, while students with worth 
grades are charged considerable tuition amounts (Garritzmann 2016). 
Thus, the relationship between public and private spending is also of 
particular interest here. 
Taken together, the vast majority of West and East European countries 
have over the past twenty years faced a reorientation of their social 
policy in the direction of the social investment perspective. The ex-
pansion of social investment policies in general seems to be a univer-
sal trend and seems to happen across welfare regimes (Hemerijck 
2013). Nonetheless, countries from all welfare state regimes have – 
even though to different degrees – increased their spending on 
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ALMPs. In addition, we can observe an expansion of work-family 
reconciliation policies most prominently in continental countries du-
ring the early 2000s and a catching up process of those policies in 
Southern European countries prior to the crisis in the late 2000s. In 
Eastern European countries the trend of an expansion of spending for 
social investment policies can be observed as well, even though those 
countries display the lowest spending level for ALMPs and a rather 
fragmentary and highly diverse development of work-family reconci-
liation policies. To summarize, several Western and Eastern European 
countries have introduced and expanded social investment policies in 
the field of labour market and family policy. However, we are not able 
to see clear empirical patterns of social investment agendas and poli-
cies yet, as we lack an encompassing overview of social investment 
agendas and reforms.  
European countries are not the only ones in which we observe social 
investment policies. Since the 1990s, social investment reforms could 
also be observed in South East Asia and Latin America. During the 
1990s, governments in Japan and South Korea, for example, have 
begun to reconfigure their welfare states, mainly by a new kind of 
social investment policy. Peng (2014) observes for both countries a 
shift in the targets of welfare state protection. “Old” social policies 
(e.g., unemployment and old age insurance), targeted at full-time male 
industrial workers, public sector employees, military personnel, and 
teachers, have been complemented by “new” social investment poli-
cies supporting labour market participation of outsiders. They incor-
porate more peripheral, marginalized, and vulnerable population 
groups such as women, the young, children, as well as the elderly. 
This shift has been accompanied by a political rhetoric of social inclu-
sion and was framed in terms of enhancing intergenerational equality. 
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The type and degree of reform, however, also varies across countries 
and programs. 
The social investment strategy in Japan seems mostly focused on re-
conciliation policies with a primary focus on child- and elderly-care 
(Peng 2014). Over the past two decades, the government incremental-
ly enlarged maternity and parental leaves and expanded childcare and 
family support services. In addition, Japan significantly expanded el-
derly-care services and long-term care insurance. As a consequence of 
a sharpened insider/outsider problematic, there was also a reform of 
the employment insurance system. This reform entailed a focus on 
older workers, women, and youths who were increasingly engaged in 
precarious working conditions. The reform involved measures to keep 
workers over the age of fifty-five in the labour market by a special 
subsidy for employers. The government also institutionalized support 
programs to address high youth un- and underemployment.  
In South Korea a more explicit discourse on social investment 
gathered much attention during the Kin Dae-Jung government (1997-
2002) and even more from the mid-2000s onwards under the Roh 
Moo-hyung government (2003-2007) (Seung-ho and Seung-yoon 
2014). The later government presented the “Vision 2030 for Economic 
Growth and Welfare” where the social investment approach was cen-
tral. In the Vision 2030 social welfare is seen as an investment in the 
future (Han 2007). In the mid-2000s the government adopted the “Ba-
sic Plan for Low Fertility and Aged Society (2006-2010)” (Seung-ho 
and Seung-yoon 2014). However, a high proportion of the expenditure 
on total family policy is allocated to cash transfers for those parents 
who stay at home (Seung-ho and Seung-yoon 2014: 12f.). Govern-
ment investments on services, such as high quality public childcare 
centre, are substantially lower that these financial transfers. Parental 
leave was introduced in 1987 by the “Equal Employment Opportunity 
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Law”, but the coverage is low. In its second period (2011-2016) the 
“Basic Plan for Low Fertility and Aged Society” focused on work-life 
balance policies.  
Taiwan, as a late industrialized country, needed to simultaneously deal 
with old and new social risks (Yeh and Lue 2014). Therefore traditio-
nal income maintenance policies and future-oriented social investment 
policies came on the political agenda at the same time (ibid.: 17). 
However, social investment policies were not supported by a majority 
in parliament, and social spending increases were concentrated on 
protective social policies, particularly pension policies.  
Overall, these examples show that South East Asian countries are 
indeed concerned with social investment agendas; during the past two 
decades they have introduced social policy reforms particularly in the 
field of family and labour market policy – however to very different 
degrees. While Japan and South Korea have introduced social in-
vestment policies in the field of family and old age policy, in Taiwan 
no majority coalition was established for social investment reforms. 
Whereas Japan and South Korea know universal public education – 
since this has been the main growth strategy in those countries after 
WWII (Peng 2014) – education in other South East Asian countries is 
almost all private. Regarding higher education, moreover, most Asia 
countries are still characterized by extremely high private and low 
public spending (Garritzmann 2016), so in this respect social in-
vestment is comparatively underdeveloped. 
Latin America as a developing region faces high levels of poverty, 
income inequality, and a sizeable minority being permanently trapped 
in inferior life trajectories (Fenwick 2014). For this continent, the lite-
rature that relates to a social investment logic of welfare policies 
seems mostly focused on Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs). CCTs 
are social assistance programs that provide cash transfers to poor 
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households. However, cash transfers are conditional on the families 
sending their children to school or participating in health plans (Bour-
guignon et al. 2003, Fenwick 2014, Huber and Stephens 2014, Nelson 
and Sanberg 2014, Sandberg 2016, Soares et al. 2009). CCTs have the 
objective to address poverty in the present, while also investing in the 
future productive capacity of young people, thus reducing the interge-
nerational transmission of poverty and supporting economic competi-
tiveness. Therefore, social investment in Latin America seems to have 
predominantly addressed poverty alleviation and investment in the life 
chances of the poor.  
CCTs seem to have spread in Latin America as a compensation to the 
social cost of structural adjustment programs initiated by the World 
Bank and the IMF at the beginning of the 1990s (Nelson and Sandberg 
2014). Among the first CCT programmes were those initiated in the 
Brazilian municipalities of Campnas and Brasilia in the mid 1990s, 
but also programmes in Mexico. Since then, 18 countries in Latin 
America have introduced CCT programs (Cecchini and Madariaga 
2011). In Brazil, for example, a first program aimed at investing in 
human capital was initiated during the Cardoso Government (Fenwick 
2014). This program began at the subnational level in 1995 and it 
sought to diminish child vagrancy by subsidies to parents who send 
their children to school. President Lula da Silva’s Worker’s Party ini-
tiated the Bolsa Familia (2003-2010), a national poverty alleviation 
program that delivers cash benefits to families in situations of extreme 
poverty (Fenwick 2014: 4ff.). Cash benefits of the program are condi-
tional on school attendance, basic health checks, and prenatal care. In 
the strongly federalist country, program implementation was contin-
gent on well functioning municipal administrations. In 2011, President 
Rousseff announced a new strategy called Brasil Sem Miséria (2010-
2014, Fenwick 2014: 7ff.). The central objectives of this umbrella 
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strategy, primarily targeted to the poor, were guarantee of income, 
access to public services (health and education) and inclusion in tech-
nical and vocational training. The strategy was designed to increase 
both citizen’s individual capacity and equality of opportunity. To 
summarize, the policy focus of Brazils CCTs was on investing in chil-
dren, investing in maternal and early childhood health, whereas gen-
der equality and increasing women’s labour market participation is not 
one of the central pillars of the agenda (Fenwick 2014: 8). More stu-
dies need to be gathered on the politics of CCTs in other Latin Ameri-
can countries, on the processes of diffusion of such policies 
throughout the Continent and the politics behind them, but also on 
other policies than CCTs that still can be associated with a social in-
vestment logic. 
In sum, social investment policies have been adapted throughout de-
mocratic countries in different world regions. The kind and degree of 
adapted policies as well as the timing of the introduction and expan-
sion of the respective policies, however, differs starkly across coun-
tries. Overall, however, we still only have eclectic knowledge on 
which social investment reforms have been implemented. We still lack 
a systematic and comprehensive overview of social investment agen-
das and policies across the democratic world. Also, given that existing 
research focuses on individual countries or regions, we lack a theo-
rization and an empirical understanding of how institutional legacies 
and actor interests influence the kind of social investment initiatives 
that arrive on the agenda, as well as their chances of being adopted.  
2.2 Effects of social investment reforms 
A second, increasingly established strand in the social investment lite-
rature investigates distributive effects of social investment policies on 
social, economic, and political outcomes, such as social cohesion or 
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poverty reduction. This research – even though focusing on the effects 
rather than the determinants of social investment reforms – may be of 
importance for understanding the politics of social investment, which 
is the main reason why we refer to it here. 
Several studies investigating childcare policies in West European 
countries have demonstrated the existence of a social bias in access to 
childcare services: high quality public childcare services is dispropor-
tionally often used by children living in higher income households 
(Abrassart and Bonoli 2015, Ghysels and Van Lancker 2011, Schlan-
ser 2011, Van Lancker and Ghysels 2012). These findings show that – 
at least in Western European countries – social investment in childcare 
is likely to support the better-offs more than the lower income quin-
tiles (a finding that we know very well from the other potentially re-
gressive educational sector, namely higher education [cf. Fernandez 
and Rogerson 1995; Garritzmann 2016]). However, if one includes 
beside pre-school care, elderly care and primary education as social 
investment policies into their estimation, new social policies perform 
better in vertical distribution than old social policies (Vaalavuo 2013). 
Newer studies show, that the effects of pre-school care services 
strongly depend on the design of those policies. A strong positive ef-
fect on social cohesion – as targeted by the social investment perspec-
tive – can only be expected if childcare use is universal or targeted to 
lower strata and if the costs for low-income families are moderate 
(Abrassart and Bonoli 2015, Zollinger fthc.). Cantillon (2011) and 
Taylor-Gooby et al. (2015) have shown that poverty rates in Western 
European countries have stagnated in the last 20 years, despite an in-
crease of spending for social investment policies. Overall, these stu-
dies have deepened our understanding of the (so far) limited potential 
of social investment family policies to foster social cohesion and po-
verty reduction. The implication of this finding for politics is that at 
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least in Europe (except in Nordic countries), the main social group 
benefitting from social investment is the (upper) middle class. This 
may be one reason why it is precisely this class that seems to be the 
main supporter of social investment (Beramendi et al. 2015, Gingrich 
and Häusermann 2015, Häusermann and Palier forthcoming). Hence, 
it may not be surprising that at best modest effects of social in-
vestment reforms on socio-economic upward mobility have been 
found – they may not have been intended in the first place.  
To give a second example, Hui and Young (2014) argue that to be 
effective and to have a social and economic return, social investment 
policies in South Korea should go beyond family policy and actively 
address the issue of the labour market. Despite the increase in family 
policy expenditure in South Korea from 2002 onwards, female labour 
market participation has decreased (Seung-ho and Seung-yoon 2014). 
Seung-ho and Seung-yoon (2014) see this as a consequence of the 
design of family policies: The highest expansion of expenditures was 
on financial transfers for childcare at home and the quality of public 
services of childcare remains low. In addition, only few South Korean 
women are insured for parental leave (insurance is restricted to those 
employees who are insured by the Korean employment insurance for 
more than 180 days), since females are concentrated in certain occu-
pational segments of the labour market with often precarious working 
conditions (Seung-ho and Seung-yoon 2014: 5f.). In these cases, the 
specific design of social investment reforms can also inform us on the 
expected support coalitions, especially regarding the support these 
policies can gather from different groups of women. 
Thirdly, several evaluation studies show positive effects – at least in 
the short-term – of Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs (Nel-
son and Sandberg 2014: 4f.). CCT programs can indeed reduce pover-
ty in the short term and the conditionality requirements increase 
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school attendance and the number of health checks. This may be part 
of the explanation why this has been the major social investment poli-
cy field in Latin America. However, the effects of CCTs on the re-
duction of intergenerational transmission of poverty – via improving 
participant’s chances of finding a job – remain weak (Cecchini and 
Madariaga 2011, Nelson and Sandberg 2014: 5ff.). Levy (2008: 78) 
pointed to the fact that without more productive jobs, poor workers 
will need CCT transfers permanently, which may affect the middle 
class support these policies have initially benefited from. Numerous 
studies also underline that the effectiveness of CCTs is contingent on 
state capacity, as well as on the availability and quality of public ser-
vices. This interaction effect will also shape the political support coa-
litions CCT reforms can rely on.  
2.3 Summary: what we know and what we don’t know 
The literature shows that there has recently been a substantial amount 
of social investment agendas and policies in several countries in diffe-
rent regions of the world. However, the turn to social investment is 
highly diverse. Countries in different regions of the world have im-
plemented different types of policy instruments with different func-
tions and different target groups. Moreover, the timing and the degree 
of the adoption of these policies vary starkly across countries.  
In addition, thanks to a growing number of studies investigating the 
impacts of social investment policies we begin to understand the ef-
fects of those policies, pointing to the winners (and the losers) of so-
cial investment policies, hence to the potential supporters of (or oppo-
nents to) social investment programmes. Taken together, our main 
take-away point from the literature on effects of social investment 
policies is to emphasize that different kinds of social investment poli-
cies can have very different socio-economic and political effects, as 
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their redistributive dynamics vary. CCTs, for example, seem to benefit 
especially lower-income groups and therefore have the progressive 
effects that policy-makers hoped for (at least in the short run). The 
expansion of childcare, higher education, and ALMPs in most OECD-
countries, however, seems to have had little effect on socio-economic 
upward mobility. Rather, the (upper) middle class seems to have bene-
fitted from these policies. We believe that in order to understand the 
politics of social investment reforms around the democratic world, we 
need to keep these differential effects in mind.  
What is still lacking in the existing literature, though, is a systematic, 
encompassing comparison of the varieties of social investment agen-
das and policies in different regions in the world, as well as an expla-
nation of this variation in terms of the political conditions facilitating 
or impeding social investment reforms. Therefore, in the WoPSI pro-
ject we first need to descriptively map which social investment poli-
cies countries have conducted. Secondly, to understand this variety, 
we need further understanding of the political conditions under which 
social investment agendas and reforms are discussed, elaborated, 
adopted, or rejected. 
3. Towards a theory of variance in social investment agendas and 
reforms 
Existing theories in comparative welfare state research and public pol-
icy analysis provide us with a large set of potential determinants that 
are relevant in understanding the cross-national and cross-regional 
variation sketched in section 2 above. In this section, we discuss these 
potential determinants as a theoretical foundation with which we can 
define the focus of the WoPSI project, and as a basis for our own the-
oretical framework.  
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3.1 Structural context conditions 
Neo-functionalistic theories (of welfare state reform) assign the deve-
lopment of welfare policies to socio-economic forces such as deindus-
trialization, globalization, skill-biased technological change, or fiscal 
constraints. Hence, according to these theories we would expect an 
increase of social investment policies in post-industrial societies (Bo-
noli and Reber 2010), as they are cross-pressured by instable family 
structures, working poverty, low fertility rates, and the dualization of 
labour markets (Emmenegger et al. 2012a, b). However, cross-
national variation within similar structural contexts (as in Western 
Europe, for example) is at odds with such a functionalist explanation. 
Therefore, structural context conditions certainly play a role in sha-
ping the policy agenda, as well as the interests and ideas of actors, but 
we can only understand their effect in interaction with existing institu-
tional legacies.  
The context of “permanent fiscal austerity” (Pierson 1998, Scharpf 
1991, Stephens et al. 1999) that has been observed in many (predomi-
nantly Western) welfare states is a context condition that deserves 
special attention, because of its political nature and its effect on actor 
dynamics: the higher the austerity pressure, the more difficult it is to 
expand social investment as yet another part of the welfare state. In 
other words, trade-offs – or recalibrations and reallocations of public 
spending – become an issue on the political agenda.  
3.2 Institutions: policy legacies and state capacity  
The notion that policy legacies matter for the design of welfare state 
reforms is a key insight from historical institutionalism (Pierson 1993, 
1996, 2000, 2001, Skocpol 1992). Historical institutionalists argue 
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that it is not only the case that actors shape policies; it is equally true 
that – once established – these policies re-shape actors’ preferences, 
strategies, and power relations. In other words, existing institutions 
affect the menu of available policy options, i.e. existing policy 
legacies – in interaction with the evolving structural context (Bera-
mendi et al. 2015, Häusermann 2010) – influence the policy agenda 
and the range of discussed policy reforms.  
Following Pierson’s (1993, 1996, 2000) and Skocpol’s (1992) seminal 
work, the bulk of existing studies has assumed that policies generate 
“positive” feedback effects, i.e. that policies reinforce themselves 
thereby making radical policy change increasingly unlikely. To give a 
classical example: In contribution-based pension systems, radical po-
licy change becomes increasingly costly for political actors because 
workers contribute throughout their working lives to these systems 
and are highly likely to oppose any change from the contribution-
based systems towards e.g. a universal entitlement system. Busemeyer 
(2015) and Garritzmann (2015, 2016), for example, have applied these 
arguments to the study of social investment policies in OECD coun-
tries, and Mettler (2002, 2005) and Mettler and Soss (2004) to the 
U.S., showing that education systems create strong positive feedback 
effects that over time lead to strong path dependencies. In this sense, 
positive feedback effects limit the range of issues that can make it to a 
policy agenda.  
On the other hand, however, scholars have theorized self-undermining 
(“negative”) feedback effects (Fernández/Jaime-Castillo 2012, Jacobs 
and Weaver 2015, Weaver 2010). To give an example, insurance-
based welfare states (endogenously) generate welfare state outsiders 
over time. In interaction with structural change in families and labour 
markets, the share of these outsiders steadily increases (Häusermann 
2010). In other words, institutional legacies may generate costs and – 
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politically speaking – their own “enemies”, just as they generate their 
own supporters (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). Hence, policy legacies 
both seem to contribute to define the boundaries of policy agendas, as 
well as the issues and proposals that make it to this agenda. In addi-
tion, they pre-structure political conflict lines.  
Regarding social investment, especially two policy legacies are likely 
to affect social investment reforms: The makeup of the existing wel-
fare state (in terms of the consumption/investment ratio), and the type 
of production regime. Regarding the makeup of the existing welfare 
state, it matters for the design and implementation of social in-
vestment policies whether extensive social compensation policies al-
ready exist and have existed for a long time (Beramendi et al. 2015). 
In the former case, social investment policies might only be possible 
at the expense of other social policies, especially in times of perma-
nent fiscal austerity, while expansive reforms are more likely in coun-
tries with a limited compensatory welfare state or a more favourable 
traditional ratio between investment and consumption.  
Regarding the production regime, the “Varieties of Capitalism” ap-
proach (Hall and Soskice 2001) argues that differences in the institu-
tional framework of the political economy generate differences in how 
much and what type of human capital countries strive for (Estevez-
Abe et al. 2001, Iversen 2005). In coordinated market economies 
(CMEs) many firms employ production strategies that rely on a labour 
force with specific skills (Hall and Soskice 2001: 24f.). Hence, firms 
in CMEs depend on education and training systems capable of provi-
ding workers with specific skills. Skill formation in liberal market 
economies (LMEs) in contrast is argued to focus on general skills. 
Only if policy makers introduce complementary institutional reforms, 
policies will be effective (ibid.: 46). The expansion of formal educa-
tion to enhance general skill levels for example will be a more effec-
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tive strategy in LMEs than in CMEs. For this reason Hall and Soskice 
(2001: 50) hypothesize a correspondence between types of political 
economies and types of welfare states (cf. also Estevez-Abe et al. 
2001, Iversen 2005). Hassel and Palier (2015) argue in a similar vein. 
According to them, governments of all advanced economies seek 
economic growth. How they can achieve economic growth, however, 
depends on the institutional capacities of their states and their political 
economies. Based on institutional legacies, governments develop and 
implemented different kinds of “employment and growth strategies” 
(Hassel and Palier 2015). They differentiate between an “export-led 
growth strategy” and a “consumption based growth strategy”. Both 
strategies imply the development of different kinds of social policies.  
Based on this literature it can be argued that the form of social in-
vestment agenda and reforms depends on the growth strategy the 
country follows. If the growth strategy is based on innovation and 
high-skilled services (like finance in UK, or ICT in California or East 
Asia) the question of skill development and education will be at the 
centre of a social investment agenda (Häusermann and Palier fthc.). 
An investment in the creation of skills and capabilities of children is 
the “sine qua non for a sustainable, efficient, and competitive 
knowledge-based production system” (Esping-Andersen 2002: 28). 
For countries, which do not pursue a growth strategy based on high-
skilled services, but rather on manufacturing production, we can ex-
pect a social investment agenda, which focuses on skill activation, 
hence without an emphasis on skill creation or preservation.   
There are two further aspects of political institutions that are relevant 
for our project. On the one hand, macro-electoral institutions (the 
electoral system, the institutions of government-formation, and power-
sharing) are relevant when theorizing how actor preferences are ag-
gregated into actual reform coalitions (Häusermann and Palier 
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forthcoming). For this reasons, we discuss them in section 3.5. below 
as conditioning factors. On the other hand, bureaucratic capacity and 
state capacity in a more fundamental sense are likely to affect social 
investment agendas and reform chances, especially in the context of 
Southern European and Latin American countries. Clientelistic and 
particularistic practices can play an important role for the expansion of 
social investment policies (Sandberg and Tally 2015). While lacking 
state capacity always negatively affects implementation and socially 
egalitarian outcomes, their impact on the politics and reform capacity 
is all but clear. They could either support an expansion, as a vote-
buying strategy of political actors (Hall 2007, Zucco 2008, 2013), or 
play against the adoption of social investment policies (lack of credi-
bility/trust).  
3.3 Ideas and framing  
In addition to structural factors and institutional legacies, ideational 
factors shape the reform proposals that build a reform agenda. A lot of 
research has been done on the social investment ideas or perspective 
as constituting a new social policy paradigm (e.g. Hemerijck 2013, 
Jenson and Saint-Martin 2006, Morel et al. 2012). The role of these 
new paradigms in shaping the diagnoses and solutions to (new) social 
and economic problems is clearly of importance to understand the 
politics of social investment. In that perspective, it seems that interna-
tional organizations (like UNICEF, the World Bank, and more re-
cently the EU) as well as some international scholars (like Giddens or 
Esping-Andersen) have contributed to promote the adoption of social 
investment policies. Rihanne Mahon (2010) has for instance underli-
ned the role of the World Bank and the OECD in promoting childcare 
policies. However, since these trends are international, and relatively 
similar at the global level, they cannot per se explain the diversity of 
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social investment policies discussed and adopted at the regional and 
national level though.  
But ideational approaches also emphasize the (instrumental) re-
framing of the political discourses as sources for policy change (Bé-
land 2005, 2009, Häusermann and Kübler 2010, Kübler 2007). The 
main argument is that rationales – or frames – can be strategically 
developed to justify (social) policy change. Framing is defined as the 
ability of actors to influence how a social problem should be inter-
preted and what the aim of a policy is (Benford and Snow 2000: 216, 
Hall 2010: 171f.). Policy frames emphasize specific aspects of a poli-
cy measure while fading out others.  
In the case of social investment, ideas and frames are particularly re-
levant for understanding both reform agendas and actual reform out-
puts, because – as we discuss in detail below – social investment is an 
ambiguous concept and provides a common-sense meaning, which is 
open to multiple interpretations and can link numerous policy com-
munities (Jenson 2010: 73f., Mahon and Lewis 2006). Non-parental 
childcare, for example, pursues different goals at the same time: 
Childcare services substitute the female caregiving function in male 
breadwinner systems. From this perspective, it can first be framed as a 
gender-equality policy (Häusermann and Kübler 2010: 173). Second, 
the investment in women can be framed as a labour-market policy. By 
the activation of female human capital, it can supply labour markets 
with high skilled women. Moreover, perceived as an investment in 
children, childcare policies can contribute to the social integration of 
children from different socio-economic and socio-cultural back-
grounds and can support social cohesion (Esping-Andersen 2002). 
Hence, it can thirdly be framed as a social-integration policy. In a si-
milar vein, Jenson distinguishes three dimensions of the social in-
vestment discourse as it was developed within the relative bureaucra-
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tic and expert networks (Jenson 2012: 28-32). The Nordic countries 
focus on human capital formation by constant, life-long learning. In 
liberal welfare regimes the second dimension – orientation to the fu-
ture – is important. Addressing child poverty was one of the big pro-
blems of New Labour. In corporatist regimes the idea that social in-
vestment policies benefit not only individuals but the whole society 
was preeminent: they supported mainly those social investment poli-
cies, which supported labour market participation and helped to raise 
fertility rates. The chosen policy instruments are according to Jenson 
dependent on which dimension is stressed over another dimension in 
the political discourse (Jenson 2012: 32). 
Given this inherent multidimensionality of social investment, ideas 
and framing (as promoted by both domestic and international political 
actors) are supposed to be a key element for understanding the reform 
agenda, i.e. the set of diagnosed problems and proposed solutions to 
them. But ideas and framing are also relevant when it comes to poli-
tics: the ambiguity inherent in the social investment concept opens up 
room for modernising coalitions between actors who purse different 
goals with the same policy instrument (Häusermann and Kübler 
2010), so-called “ambiguous agreements” (Palier 2005). Hence, we 
can expect political actors to reframe the political discourse strategi-
cally in order to build majority coalitions in favour of a social in-
vestment reform.  
3.4 Actors and preferences 
Social policies are the result of a distributive struggle between diffe-
rent societal interests (Esping-Andersen 1990, Huber et al. 1993, Kor-
pi 1983, Stephens 1979). Political parties, trade unions, and employers 
have been identified as key representatives of these interests, which is 
why their preferences matter for understanding the politics of social 
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investment. In addition, bureaucratic actors and experts are also rele-
vant when explaining public policy variation.   
Social policy outputs in the industrial age were generally conceived as 
the result of the distribution of power between collective actors – es-
pecially political parties – representing the interests of labour and ca-
pital (Alt 1985, Hibbs 1977), i.e. a one-dimensional axis with state-
interventionism on one extreme and market-oriented policies on the 
other. In this view of a distributive conflict, welfare state policies are 
conceptualized along such an economic left-right dimension. Whereas 
left political parties and trade unions are assumed to stand up for wel-
fare state expansion, right-wing parties and employers are theorized to 
want to limit welfare state development (Boix 1998, Busemeyer 2009, 
Castles 1989, 1998, Esping-Andersen 1990, Huber and Stephens 
2000, 2001, Huo et al. 2008, Schmidt 1996, Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 
2008). Several studies have shown that the expansion of the welfare 
state in capitalistic democracies during the “Golden Age” can be rea-
sonably well explained on the basis of this model (Esping-Andersen 
1990, Huber and Stephens 2001, Korpi 1983, Myles and Quadango 
2002: 38).  
Several authors have transferred these arguments to the study of social 
investment, in particular with regard to new social risks. Some have 
remained highly sceptical as to the chances for substantial change in 
the direction of social investment policies, since the victims of post-
industrial social needs and demands – such as lone mothers, young 
families, low educated persons, or divorced parents – are a very hete-
rogeneous and dispersed group that is not only weakly represented in 
parliaments, parties, and trade unions, but also unlikely to mobilize 
massively (Bonoli 2005, Ebbinghaus 2006). People concerned with 
new social risks lack the conscience of a “common cause”, i.e. their 
specific needs diverge too much (Kitschelt and Rehm 2006), and there 
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is no single actor likely to bundle these interests, as both parties and 
trade unions are conflicted between the preferences and interests of 
different constituencies (Häusermann 2010, Rueda 2007). Against this 
background, social investment policies (at least those targeted at new 
social risk constituencies) “are unlikely to be the result of the political 
mobilization of those who benefit from them only" (Bonoli 2013: 55).  
Power resource theory thus allows developing hypotheses in both di-
rections: Either social investment policies are – just like other social 
policies – introduced and expanded by (left-wing) political actors, or 
parties and unions are unlikely to matter in the case of social in-
vestment because the affected groups are too marginalized. Several 
studies have tested these claims and came to diverging conclusions. 
Huo et al. (2008) find support for the importance of left parties for the 
expansion of active labour market policies (ALMPs). In their view, 
left parties favour ALMPs (and not only de-commodifying policies), 
since social democrats have a preference for full employment, and 
ALMPs – as well as all other kind of social investment policies – can 
contribute to this end (Huo et al. 2008: 7). Boix (1998) and Iversen 
and Stephens (2008) confirmed this finding, but others found no ef-
fects and emphasize the fact that Social Democracy is torn between 
different goals (job creation vs. job protection) when it comes to la-
bour market policy (Rueda 2005, 2007, Tepe and Vanhuysse 2013, 
Van Vliet and Koster 2011). Similarly, political conflict lines are con-
tested when it comes to family policy and education policies. While 
many studies still find left-wing parties to be the most important 
advocates of progressive family and education policies (Boix 1998, 
Busemeyer 2009, Castles 1982, Garritzmann 2016, Häusermann and 
Zollinger 2015, Hieda 2013, Iversen and Stephens 2008, Naumann 
2012, Schmidt 2007), several studies also emphasize that the political 
configuration of interests is not as clear-cut as in the past (recently for 
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example Garritzmann and Seng 2016 for the case of education), es-
pecially as current welfare politics implies difficult trade-offs: trade-
unions may privilege consumption instead of investment, whereas 
employers may prioritize investment over consumption (Beramendi et 
al. 2015). This is in line with Breunig and Busemeyer’s (2012) finding 
that discretionary spending (such as education and many other social 
investments) are more retrenched in times of austerity than entitlement 
spending (such as pensions). In addition, market-liberal parties and 
employers have supported activation-oriented types of family policy 
expansion in many countries (Häusermann 2006, Hieda 2013).  
Theorizing the positions of collective political actors with regard to 
investment reforms is further complicated by the fact that the mem-
bership profile and constituencies of these actors have radically 
changed. While Social Democrats have become middle class parties 
and trade unions tend to represent workers with above-average wages 
(Gingrich and Häusermann 2015, Becher and Pontusson 2011), the 
traditional working class voters increasingly vote for the populist right 
(Rydgren 2012). Therefore, in order to understand actor interests and 
strategies, it has become more fruitful to theorize preferences at the 
level of social groups (rather than at the level of collective actors, Be-
ramendi et al. 2015), because the collective actors who represent these 
societal interests vary across countries and contexts. In this vein, and 
based on what we know from the literature on the effects of social 
investment, we may hypothesize that the educated middle classes, as 
well as parts of business should be the most ardent supporters of social 
investment reforms (Beramendi et al. 2015, Häusermann and Palier 
forthcoming). Besides social classes, women can be seen as another 
important social constituency for social investment policies. Especial-
ly for the expansion of family policies – which ease the conciliation of 
care and work – political power resources of women are seen as an 
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important explaining factor. Several authors have pointed to the fact 
that women’s movements as well as their representation have an in-
fluence on welfare state development (Huber and Stephens 2000, 
2001, Naumann 2005, O’Connor et al. 1999, Orloff 1993, 2006, 
Sainsbury 1996, 1999), and the expansion of reconciliation policies – 
at least in OECD countries – is indeed positively correlated with the 
share of women in parliaments (descriptive and substantive repre-
sentation) (Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007, Campbell et al. 2010).  
Moreover, politics is not just a struggle between societal interests, but 
this struggle is shaped and guided by bureaucrats, civil servants, and 
experts. Jenson (2012: 23) argues that innovations concerning a social 
investment oriented welfare state emerged within the public adminis-
tration. She argues that unelected civil servants played a crucial role in 
reconfiguring the universe of political discourse, i.e. the development 
of the social investment perspective. The public administration is en-
gaged in puzzling over policy problems and in doing so civil servants 
are developers of social knowledge. The configuration of the political 
discourse is a power resource, since it provides greater representative 
legitimacy to some actors and their ideas than to others (Jenson 1989). 
In broad networks involving actors from international organizations or 
scientific actors, bureaucratic actors are able to promote ideas and 
control the discourse in the political space (Jenson 2012: 24). Accor-
ding to Jenson (2012: 33), the public administration – and especially 
the finance ministries – is a central actor in promoting the social in-
vestment idea as well as concrete policy proposals. 
3.5 Conditional explanations of policy variation  
Over the past decade, the comparative welfare state literature has em-
phasized that welfare politics can and should not be conceptualized in 
a purely linear way, as the outcome of interests and power relations 
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only. Rather, both the interests and the interactions of actors are con-
ditioned by important context factors (Häusermann et al. 2013). 
Hence, when explaining the success or failure of reform coalitions in 
favour of social investment, such conditional arguments are highly 
relevant. There are three crucial conditioning factors that have been 
analysed in the literature: 1) the institutional policy legacies that shape 
actor preferences, 2) the relative saliency of different political clea-
vages which condition coalition-formation between actors, and 3) the 
macro-electoral institutions that condition power relations and the 
likeliness of coalition-formation.  
Let us first focus on policy legacies as conditioning factors of actor 
interests. The idea here is that the distributive effects of a particular 
reform depend on the pre-existing policy legacies. Therefore, the posi-
tions of actors will reflect this interaction of distributive preferences 
and policy legacies. For example, several authors argue that party po-
sitions in the field of education policy can only be understood if one 
takes into account the distributive consequences of the existing educa-
tion system (Ansell 2010, Fernandez and Rogerson 1995, Garritzmann 
2016, Gingrich and Ansell 2015, Iversen 2006). Consequently, left 
parties cannot be expected to be universally in favour of higher spen-
ding levels in all cases. Higher education, for example, is fiscally re-
gressive, if enrolment rates are not universal and access to higher edu-
cation institutions is stratified by family background (Fernandez and 
Rogerson 1995). Complicating things further, the redistributive pat-
terns might change over time as enrolment levels increase (Ansell 
2010) and they become even more difficult to disentangle when we 
simultaneously take public and private spending into account and dif-
ferentiate between different kinds of spending (Garritzmann 2016). 
Thus, the preferences of parties are likely to vary depending on the 
type of spending, the status quo of the respective education system, 
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the access conditions, and other institutional context factors. Similar-
ly, Gingrich and Ansell (2015) show that the preferences of left- and 
right-wing actors in favour or against activating labour market reforms 
depend on the dualized or universal structure of the labour market. In 
other words, distributive effects of investments in ALMP depend on 
their interaction with pre-existing employment regulation. For our 
project, this implies that expected preferences of societal groups, poli-
tical parties, and other collective actors will depend on the distributive 
consequences of specific policy proposals and the already established 
status quo of the respective systems. Hence, conditional on policy 
legacies, similar actors may support different social investment poli-
cies in different contexts.  
A second conditioning factor that affects the theorization of actor inte-
rests and strategies (beyond a simple left-right dimension) is that the 
political space (in Western Europe) today is not one-dimensional, but 
at least two-dimensional, with distributive social and economic con-
flicts being complemented by a second, cultural and identity-based 
dimension of political competition (Häusermann 2010, Kitschelt 1994, 
Manow et al. forthcoming). This second dimension opposes advocates 
of cultural liberalism and libertarian values to advocates of conserva-
tism and traditionalism. Because of the relevance of social investment 
for gender equality, equality of opportunity, and education, these va-
lues bear strong relevance also for the distributive politics of social 
investment (Fossati and Häusermann 2014, Häusermann 2010). In 
today’s welfare politics, political parties position themselves in this 
two-dimensional policy space, which opens up opportunities for new 
actor coalitions. This two-dimensional actor configuration can provide 
a basis for modernizing coalitions (again “ambiguous agreements”, cf. 
Palier 2005) among left-progressive actors and liberal actors, such as 
business interests or market-liberal parties (Beramendi et al. 2015, 
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Häusermann 2010). According to this argument, the high diversity of 
social investment policy reforms is the result of new political coalition 
dynamics in a multi-dimensional policy space. This implies that 
simple, linear arguments for policy change (e.g. “the stronger the left, 
the more expenditures”) will not be sufficient. Rather, we need to take 
into account the number and kind of conflict lines a policy reform 
generates, as well as the relative saliency of these conflict lines, in 
order to conceptualize the coalitional dynamics of social investment 
politics.  
Finally, the macro-electoral institutions of a country influence the 
kinds of coalitions that are likely to form. While power-sharing insti-
tutions increase the number of veto points and therefore the obstacles 
for successful policy change (Huber et al. 1993, Lijphart 1999, Tsebe-
lis 1995, 2002), they also allow for increased coalitional flexibility 
and for multidimensional reform politics (Häusermann 2010). Hence, 
while social policy reforms are clearly slowed down by decentralized 
state structures (Vatter 2002, 2014), the influence of proportional po-
wer sharing on social policy reforms is less clear (Vatter and Freitag 
2002). Lijphart (1999) argued that compared to majoritarian political 
systems, consensus oriented political systems – characterized by pro-
portional distribution of political power in legislative and executive – 
can have a positive influence on social spending (mostly via me-
chanisms of coalition-building and log-rolling, see Birchfield and 
Crepaz 1998 on this). Häusermann and Palier (forthcoming) argue that 
in a consensual institutional framework, coalitional dynamics are 
more flexible, and varying alliance potentials have better chances to 
result into actual social investment reform coalitions.  
To summarize, the literature review showed that an analysis of the 
variety of social investment agendas and policies should consider a 
number of structural, institutional, and actor-based determinants, as 
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well as – importantly – their interactions. Regarding the structural and 
institutional context factors, socio-economic factors (such as globali-
zation, deindustrialization, changing family structures, etc.), policy 
legacies (especially existing welfare state and social investment 
legacies as well as the type of production regime), and political insti-
tutions appear to be crucial. Regarding actors and power relations, 
studies of the politics of social investment need to consider the role of 
societal groups and political parties, of unions, employers, public ad-
ministrations, and experts. We by now also know that not only the 
relative power of these actors, but even their policy preferences are 
contingent on a number of factors. In other words, we should not treat 
actor positions as exogenously given (anymore). A theoretical frame-
work to explain variance of social investment agendas and reforms 
therefore needs to integrate these factors and their interactions into a 
model of political coalition-formation. This is what the WoPSI-project 
aims at. 
4. The WoPSI project 
 
4.1 The core research questions 
Several studies have documented the existence of a high variety of 
social investment agendas and policies in different countries around 
the globe. However, there exists neither a systematic descriptive com-
parison of the existing variety of policy agendas and reforms nor a 
systematic analytic comparison on how this variety of social in-
vestment agendas and policy reforms can be explained. Our research 
project intends to address this research gap by studying the politics of 
social investment across democratic countries in Latin America, Asia, 
as well as Eastern and Western Europe from a comparative perspec-
tive. An analysis of the variety of social policies has to explain both 
social investment agendas and social investment reforms and it has to 
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take complex conditional effects of contexts on coalition dynamics 
into account. We are interested in the following research questions:  
 How do social investment agendas and social investment po-
licy reforms vary across democratic countries around the 
globe? How can we explain this diversity? 
 Under what political conditions do social investment agendas 
and/or reforms develop? 
4.2 Key concepts and definitions 
 
4.2.1 What is social investment? 
“Social investment” is a very broad concept. Accordingly, very diffe-
rent definitions and understandings of what social investment is (or 
should be) exist in the literature. In order to clarify our understanding 
of social investment and in order to allow systematic comparative em-
pirical analysis, we provide here our definition of the concept. We 
find it helpful to think about social investment in terms of its goals, 
functions, and policies. We refrain from providing a simple policy-
based definition, because many (if not all) social policies can include 
elements of social investments, which might be overlooked when fo-
cusing too narrowly on a few specific policies only.  
1. The goals of social investment. Social investment aims to prepare, 
support, and equip individuals in a way that increases their 
chance to participate in the knowledge-based economy and re-
duces their future risks of income loss and poverty. Hence, it is 
about investing welfare resources now in order to harvest returns 
in the future. This strategy involves avoiding social risks and 
overcoming intergenerational transfer of disadvantages and po-
verty (Esping-Andersen 2002, Jenson 2010). In other words, so-
cial investment aims to prepare individuals to have less to repair. 
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The future-oriented social investment logic stands in contrast to 
purely transfer-oriented consumption policies (Beramendi et al. 
2015, Hemerijck 2012, Morel et al. 2012). Whereas consumption-
oriented policies provide social security immediately via de-
commodifying social policies such as income replacement in case 
of unemployment, old age, or sickness, social investment policies 
work differently, as they focus on future income-streams. The 
goals of the social investment strategy are Janus-faced: social in-
vestment policies serve both social and economic goals (Kvist 
2016). In terms of social returns, social investment policies are 
supposed to contribute to decrease poverty levels in the longer 
run, to increase social cohesion, reduce inequalities, and contri-
bute to human development. In terms of economic returns, the so-
cial investment perspective expects to increase labour market par-
ticipation and employment performance. A better-educated and 
better-equipped population is expected to contribute to higher 
growth rate (since workers can better contribute to the knowledge 
based economy). Beyond education and training, social in-
vestment is also aimed at better helping people to mobilise, pre-
serve, and improve their working capacities and skills. Increased 
labour market participation, less unemployment, and more growth 
can – in turn – enlarge the tax base, increase the volume of social 
contribution and taxes paid, thus contribute to the future viability 
of the welfare state.   
2. The functions of social investment: create, mobilise, and preserve 
skills/human capital/capabilities. In a life course perspective so-
cial investment policies have the function to enable individuals to 
prevent and/or overcome difficult life events and life transitions 
without losing their earnings capacity (Kvist 2016: 6f.). Accor-
ding to this perspective, social investment policies help to create, 
strengthen, maintain, re-establish, and use individuals’ capabili-
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ties and skills. One can thus distinguish three main functions of 
social investment programmes. Social investment policies can 
first refer to an investment in human capital formation (skill crea-
tion). Second, it can comprise an investment in the mobilization 
of human capital for labour market participation (skill mobilisa-
tion). Third, an investment in the preservation and improvement 
of human skills and capabilities to better handle life events and 
transitions (skill preservation). Skill creation focuses on the for-
mation of human capital (creating capabilities), skill mobilisation 
focuses on the effective use of existing human resources, and skill 
preservation focuses on the maintenance or improvement of the 
capabilities. Social investment policies aim at fulfilling (one or 
more of) these functions. 
3. Social investment policies. Many different policies can serve the 
social investment goals and fulfil social investment functions. 
Most immediately and obviously, the social investment perspec-
tive translates into strengthening certain education and social po-
licies and into developing accessible and high quality welfare ser-
vices. Starting from a Western European perspective, a key focus 
of our project will, of course, lie on social investment in the field 
of family, labour market, and education policies (early childhood 
education and care, school and post-secondary education, as well 
as lifelong learning). However, following our definition of the so-
cial investment concept – including an integrated life course ap-
proach to human capital enhancement – other policy fields such 
as health care policy, housing, or disability policy may also be 
concerned with a social investment agenda and/or reforms. As 
pointed out by YM Kim (2007: 14-19, 18), a precondition for so-
cial investment to work is that various factors such as a decent 
home and community environments, good health care, and culture 
and physical fitness policies are present. Therefore, any strategy 
LIEPP Working Paper n° 64 
39 
to enhance or use human capital needs to recognize the influence 
of the social setting (ibid.: 18). Next to the usual set of policy 
domains (early childcare and education policies, conciliation of 
work and life policies, active labour market policies, and trai-
ning), this can also be obtained by labour market policies that 
support the move from school to work for young people, by gene-
ral housing supporting low income groups, or by programs sup-
porting physical training for elderly people (Kvist 2016: 7). Con-
ditional cash transfer policies for example – which are prominent 
in Latin American countries – make health insurance coverage for 
poor people conditional on sending children to a physician for a 
general check up. 
So how can we identify social investment policies concretely? In order 
to be classified as a social investment policy in our understanding, a 
policy must aim to achieve (some of) the aforementioned goals and 
functions. If one looks at the goals and functions of social investment 
policies, there are sometimes ambivalent domains, such as active la-
bour market policies. The activation of unemployed people for the 
labour market by negative incentives such as sanctions and benefit 
reductions only is not part of our understanding of the social in-
vestment logic (cf. also Bonoli 2013, Taylor-Gooby 2004). Only posi-
tive skill creation, mobilization, and preservation, corresponds to our 
understanding of social investment. The goal of social returns can be 
reached by social inclusion, by fostering capabilities (improving skills 
and empowering jobless people) and by securing quality jobs (Bonoli 
2013: 23, Morel et al. 2012: 9f.).  
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4.2.2 Social investment agendas  
In order to analyse the politics of social investment, we are convinced 
that we first need to understand the dynamics leading to a social in-
vestment policy agenda. An agenda comprises a politicized problem, a 
diagnosis of the problem, and a proposed policy solution (Kingdon 
2010). However, in the policy analysis literature there is a distinction 
between a public and a formal agenda (Howlett et al. 2009). A public 
agenda comprises all salient topics put forward in public debates, for 
example during election campaigns or in the mass media. A formal 
agenda more narrowly is defined as a problem, which is put on the 
parliamentary agenda. A formal agenda comprises all governmental 
bills discussed in parliamentary decision-making processes. To make 
agendas observable, we follow a two-step definition, which encom-
passes beside a formal agenda the public discourse (public agenda) as 
well.  
First, we focus on the formal agenda. A formal agenda comprises all 
policy proposals that are discussed in parliaments. This includes pro-
posals that became bills and laws in the end, but also non-adopted 
proposals (e.g., suggested by oppositional politicians). However, we 
argue that not everything that is politicized in public debates leaves a 
trace in parliament. We expect that there exist big and publicly visible 
social investment campaigns, which never make their way on the for-
mal agenda, but which might still be of interest for understanding the 
politics of social investment. The fact that they comprise non-
decisions is also telling for our project.  
Therefore, we are also interested in visible public social investment 
campaigns for example during elections. Such campaigns putting so-
cial investment policies or strategies on the public agenda can consist 
in initiatives of interest groups and local movements, as well as major 
campaigns and/or manifestos of political parties or politicians, which 
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may be salient during elections. To summarise, while public and for-
mal agendas need to be kept analytically apart, we are interested in an 
analysis of formal and public agendas comprising social investment 
policy proposals.  
4.2.3 Social investment reforms 
Most of our interest lies in understanding the political processes lea-
ding to the adoption of social investment policies or reforms. In most 
cases, it will be reforms, in the sense that the policy decisions are em-
bedded in already existing sets of polices that are changed and ad-
justed (reformed) by the decisions taken. This is why we prefer to use 
the “reforms” terminology (instead of “adoption” or “introduction”), 
as it suggests that reforms are more likely to happen than the esta-
blishment of entirely new policies. Social investment reforms always 
take place in a given (institutional) context. A policy reform is defined 
as a policy output that results from a parliamentary decision-making 
process. A policy reform comprises a formalized policy solution in the 
form of a law or a decree. One policy reform can include a range of 
different elements, whereby maybe only one of those elements com-
plies with our definition of social investment. By a reform element we 
mean one single instrument of intervention. If one of the reform ele-
ments corresponds to our definition of social investment, this part of 
the policy reform should be defined as a social investment reform. It 
should be studied as such, in its interaction with the other parts of the 
reform since it may well be part of a policy package that is of interest 
to understand social investment. 
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4.3 The theoretical framework of the WoPSI project 
To understand the high variety of social investment agendas and poli-
cy reforms in different democratic countries, we argue that political 
coalitions (actors and their interests), as well as the institutional em-
beddedness of social investment politics are key factors. Social in-
vestment strategies first need to be put on the public or formal agenda. 
In a second step, the parliamentary decision-making process is crucial 
in understanding success or failure of a proposal and the content it will 
eventually take. Hence we need to theorize both the determinants of 
agendas and reforms sequentially. We draw on the discussion of exis-
ting theories in chapter 3 to develop a theoretical framework that is 
both encompassing and analytically distinctive. We summarize our 
theoretical framework in figure 1 below.  
In terms of the analytical focus of the project, we particularly empha-
size the role of (1) institutions, i.e. existing policy legacies and (2) 
coalitional dynamics for explaining reform outputs. More concretely, 
we argue that the institutional embeddedness of social investment po-
litics as well as political coalitions (actors and their interests) are key 
factors in explaining the high variety of social investment agendas and 
policies between countries (Häusermann and Palier fthc.). Policy 
legacies condition the way structural pressures appear on the reform 
agenda, and they also influence the actors, their interests and their 
ideas that are relevant at this stage. As for political coalitions, we con-
sider them a key factor because of the well-established multidimen-
sionality of social investment.  
More specifically, we first argue that the social investment policy 
agenda of a country depends crucially on the pre-existing institutional 
context in the form of policy legacies, as well as on the interaction of 
these policy legacies with structural changes. In other words: socio-
economic conditions, such as high divorce or high child poverty rates 
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do not directly explain the type of problems policy makers perceive as 
relevant and the respective policy agenda. The specific institutional 
context interacts with structural problem pressures and leads to diffe-
rent policy agendas for different types of welfare and production re-
gimes (Iversen and Wren 1998; Scharpf and Schmid 2000). In addi-
tion to policy legacies, the presence and relative power of actor inte-
rests, as well as ideas promoted by national and international bureau-
cratic expert actors account for social investment agendas. 
Second, we argue that the political success of these (agenda-specific) 
social investment policy proposals depends on the availability of a 
political majority coalition, which supports the reform proposals in the 
political decision-making process. Such a coalition does not require 
consensus or unanimity and based on the highly ambiguous character 
of the social investment concept different actors can support a policy 
reform for quite different reasons. However, a policy reform needs a 
political coalition that is broad enough to establish a majority. Both 
the configuration of actor interests and their power relations, as well 
as their framing strategies and the macro-institutional environment 
will shape the likelihood for agenda proposals to result in a suffi-
ciently large support coalition in order to be adopted.  
As the literature review illustrates, social policymaking is influenced 
by (several types of) actors at multiple stages. We distinguish the rele-
vant actors in the process of agenda setting (interests I, see figure 1) 
from those actors relevant for coalition formation (interests II, see 
figure 1). As for “Interest I” (actors acting upon the agenda setting), 
we see a broad range of potentially relevant actors. Beside political 
parties, trade-unions, and employers, technocratic experts (oftentimes 
from international organizations) contribute to the advocacy of social 
investment in a country and can have a substantial influence in the 
process of agenda-setting. Not only public administration but producer 
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and interest groups as well as social movements, scientific experts, 
and journalists can certainly contribute strongly to the shape of the 
social investment agenda in a country. As policy entrepreneurs (King-
don 1995) they contribute to the diagnosis of problems, the formula-
tion of solutions and the strategic coupling of the policy streams du-
ring critical moments.  
However, in democratic countries policy reforms are the product of 
parliamentary decision-making processes. Policy reforms depend on 
the presence of relevant social forces that are able and willing to sup-
port (a reorientation of) a policy. Such social forces are mobilized and 
organized by – country-specific – collective actors (political parties or 
interest organizations, trade unions etc.). We argue that thinking about 
support coalitions for social investment in terms of class coalitions 
makes sense politically. Hence, as relevant actors in the decision ma-
king process of social investment reforms (Interests II) we see all col-
lective actors – representing social classes – involved in parliamentary 
decisions.  
Figure 1: Theoretical model explaining social investment agendas 
and reforms 
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In sum, we are interested in an analysis of the agenda setting dyna-
mics and/or the dynamics of reform-processes. Within these two 
areas, we are particularly interested in policy legacies as well as coali-
tional dynamics as important mechanisms explaining policy agendas 
and social investment reforms respectively. As illustrated in figure 1, 
we want – however – to keep a sufficiently open analytical perspec-
tive on further determinants, since we are aware that country- or re-
gion-specific specific idiosyncrasies may matter greatly. 
The goal of the project is to answer our research questions on the basis 
of empirical studies of social investment agendas and reforms in Latin 
America, East Asia, as well as Eastern and Western Europe. We are 
only interested in democratic countries. The analyses should map and 
explain social investment strategies appearing on the formal or the 
public agenda, as well as social investment policy reforms in the pe-
riod between 1990 and 2016. An obvious focus lies on social in-
vestment strategies and policies in the field of family, labour market, 
and education policy. However, according to our definition of social 
investment (see above), it is possible that social investment proposals 
or reforms can be observed in other policy fields such as health or 
housing policy, as well. Hence, we deliberately do not restrict our em-
pirical design to specific policy fields. Rather, we are interested in 
social investment agendas and reforms in all social policy fields.  
For the part of the project that will systematically trace the agenda- 
and coalition-building processes around social investment reforms, 
our units of analysis are the proposals that form the social investment 
agenda, as well as individual social investment policy reform pro-
cesses. Our key focus lies on formal agendas and legislative reform 
processes at the national level. However, if there have been important 
and major reforms and/or political debates at the subnational level, we 
include agenda-setting and/or coalitional dynamics at the subnational 
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level as well. Sources for quantitative or qualitative data on social 
investment agendas and reforms can vary across countries, depending 
on the political systems. For the systematic tracing of the politics of 
social investment across world regions, we envisage the data collec-
tion in two steps. The objective of the first stage of data collection is 
to compile an inventory of social investment agendas and reforms 
between 1990 and 2016. The second stage requires data on factors 
explaining variance in social investment agendas and/or reforms. Ac-
cording to our theoretical argument, we choose to focus mainly on 
policy legacies as crucial determinants of social investment agendas 
and coalitional dynamics (interests) as determinants of policy re-
forms.  
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